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Abstract
Paying different wages to workers of equal productivity because of demographic groups to
which they belong is illegal in the US and other Western countries. Yet, the vast economic
literature on wage discrimination has entirely overlooked this fact when modeling the
employer’s discriminatory behavior. Consequently, the desirability of practicing wage
discrimination, whether arising from differences in labor supply elasticities or from an
inherent taste for discrimination, has never been confronted with the risk of getting caught
and punished due to violating the equal pay law. Incorporating this risk into Joan Robinson’s
(1969) discriminatory monopsony model and Gary Becker’s (1971) taste−for−discrimination
model, this paper examines the effects that illegalizing wage discrimination may have on the
wage differential under discriminatory monopsonistic and competitive conditions. The
analysis unveils a sharp contrast in the effect of illegalization in the alternative settings.
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Paying different wages to workers of equal productivity because of demographic 
groups to which they belong is illegal in the US and other Western countries.
1 Yet, the 
vast economic literature on wage discrimination in monopsonistic and competitive 
markets has entirely overlooked this fact when modeling the employer’s 
discriminatory behavior.
2 Consequently, the desirability of practicing wage 
discrimination, whether arising from differences in labor supply elasticities or from an 
inherent taste for discrimination, has never been confronted with the risk of getting 
caught and punished due to violating the equal pay law. This is particularly odd 
considering the fact that the role of deterrence in eliminating the employer's incentive 
for committing a closely related violation, paying workers less than the minimum 
wage, has gained considerable attention in the economic literature.
3 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the effects that illegalizing wage 
discrimination may have on the wage differential between two groups of equally 
productive workers under discriminatory monopsonistic and competitive conditions. 
The risk of getting caught and punished (henceforth, “enforcement”) is therefore 
incorporated into Joan Robinson’s (1934) discriminatory monopsony model and Gary 
Becker’s (1971) taste-for-discrimination model. The analysis unveils a sharp contrast 
in the effect of illegalization under the alternative settings: while illegalization 
reduces the wage differential in the monopsonistic framework, acting to offset the 
incentive for discrimination arising by differences in labor supply elasticities, it 
counter-intuitively  deepens  the wage differential in the competitive framework. 
Furthermore, while a sufficiently high level of enforcement would eliminate the wage 
differential in the monopsonistic case, there is no level of enforcement that would do 
so in the competitive case. A sufficiently high level of enforcement would simply 
eliminate the incentive for employers to hire the discriminated-against group. 




                 2. ILLEGALIZATION IN A MONOPSONISTIC MARKET 
 
Consider a monopsonistic employer who produces a given product with two types of 
workers, A and B (e.g., males and females, whites and blacks), where A and B denote 
also the quantity employed of each type. Being a single employer in the markets for A 
and  B, the monopsonist faces an upward-sloping supply curve for labor in each 
market: increasing the employment of either A or B workers would thus require the 
payment of a higher wage rate. Denoting the wage rates of A and B workers by wA and 
wB, respectively, it then follows that wk = wk(k) for k ˛ (A, B), where wk¢(k) > 0. 
 
Suppose now that  A and  B workers have identical productive skills, hence the 
employer’s production function  is given by () fWB + , where, by assumption, the 
marginal product of each type of workers is positive and diminishing (i.e., 
0,0 ff ¢¢¢ >< . Seeking to maximize his profit, the employer may consider the 
possibility of discriminating against B workers by paying them a lower wage than he 
pays A workers. Suppose, however, that wage discrimination is forbidden by law, 
being subject to the risk of getting caught and punished. Should he discriminate and get caught, the employer will be fined in proportion l (>1) to his unpaid wages to B 
workers, [wA(A) - wB(B)]B.   
 
Assuming a unit product price, the employer will choose the employment levels of A 
and B workers so as to maximize his expected profit  
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where  p denotes the probability of getting caught and punished, assumed to be 
independent of the wage differential or the employment levels. The first-order 
conditions for a maximum are   
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where ep l = represents the level of law enforcement.  
 
Equations (2) and (3) have a simple interpretation: shifting the expressions with the 
minus sign to the right-hand side, maximization of the expected profit requires that 
the marginal revenue from employment equate the expected marginal cost. While the 
marginal revenue from each type of workers is identical, f ¢(A + B), the expected 
marginal cost differs. Employing an additional worker of type A involves the payment 
of the wage rate to that worker, wA(A), an additional payment to all other workers 
following the rise in wage along the upward-sloping supply curve, wA¢(A)A, as well as 
an increment to the expected penalty due to the widening of the wage differential 
between A and B, paid to all B workers, ewA¢(A)B. On the other hand, employing an 
additional worker of type  B involves, in addition to the wage rate, wB(B), and the 
additional payments to other workers, wB¢(B)B, an increment to the expected penalty 
due to underpaying that worker, e[wA(A) - w B(B)], as well as a reduction in the 
expected penalty due to the narrowing of the wage differential, ewB¢(B)B.  
 
Rearranging, conditions (2) and (3) may be written as 
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,                  (3') where  )] ( / ) ( ' [ / 1 k w k k w k k k = h  denotes the labor supply elasticity for workers of 
type k ˛ (A, B). Dividing one equation by the other and rearranging, the employer's 
optimum must satisfy 
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The neoclassical theory of the discriminatory monopsonist [e.g., Robinson (1934), 
Madden (1973)] implicitly assumes that wage discrimination is not illegal. 
Consequently, there is no enforcement. Substituting e = 0 in equation (4) yields the 
well-known result of this theory: the employer would pay A workers a higher wage 
than he pays B workers (i.e., wA > wB) if, and only if, the labor supply elasticity of the 
former is greater than that of the latter (i.e., hA > hB). Given, however, that wage 
discrimination is illegal and accompanied by some enforcement, an elasticity 
differential is no longer a sufficient condition for discrimination. Because the e-term 
subtracted from the numerator in (4) is greater than that subtracted from the 
denominator, a sufficiently high level of enforcement may offset the incentive for 
discrimination generated by an elasticity differential,                              
 
Suppose henceforth that the labor supply curves of A and B workers have constant 
elasticity  and  that  hA > hB.
 4  In  the  absence  of  an  equal pay legislation, the profit-
maximizing monopsonist will therefore discriminate against B workers. Condition (4) 
may now be used to prove three propositions regarding the effects of illegalizing  
discrimination on the wage differential between A and B workers, wA(A) - wB(B).  
 
Proposition  1: Illegalization of wage discrimination, accompanied by some 
enforcement, will increase the wage rate of B workers and reduce the wage rate of A 
workers, therefore reducing the wage differential in a monopsonistic market.  
 
Proof: Totally differentiating equations (2') and (3') with respect to A, B, and e yields  
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2. The second-order conditions for the maximization of the expected 
profit require that  W1 < 0, W2 < 0, and W > 0 at the optimum.
5 It can easily be verified  
that  W3 < 0 as well. To prove Proposition 1, we evaluate the signs of (5) and (6) at the 
state of zero enforcement, prevailing before illegalization. Substituting  e = 0 in 
condition (4) reveals that wA(A) = [(1 + 1/hB) / (1 + 1/hA)]wB(B) < (1 + 1/hB)wB(B). 
Hence, the expression in the square brackets of (5) and (6) is negative. Consequently, 
dA/de < 0 and dB/de > 0 at e = 0. Because wA(A) and wB(B) are increasing in A and B, 
respectively, it follows that illegalizing discrimination would decrease w A(A) and  
increase wB(B), thus reducing the wage differential between A and B workers, wA(A) - 
wB(B). ¦        
 
Proposition 2: Given that wage discrimination is illegal, yet a wage differential still 
exists, increasing the level of enforcement will further reduce the wage differential in 
a monopsonistic market. 
 
Proof: By Proposition 1, illegalizing discrimination will decrease wA(A) and increase 
wB(B). Consequently, the expression in the square brackets of (5) and (6), which has 
been shown to be negative for e = 0, will become even smaller (hence more negative) 
after discrimination is illegalized and some enforcement is introduced.
6 Increasing 
enforcement at this point must thus result in dA/de < 0 and dB/de > 0 as well, leading 
to a further reduction in the wage differential between A and B workers. ¦    
 
Proposition 3: A sufficiently high (though less than unity) level of enforcement will 
eliminate the wage differential in a monopsonistic market.  
 
Proof: Let  e ~denote the level of enforcement that eliminates the wage differential. 
Substituting wA(A) = wB(B) in equation (4) and solving for e ~ yields        
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Hence, an elasticity differential is necessary, but no longer sufficient to ensure 
discrimination. A wage differential will arise only if e <  e ~. Because A and B are 
functions  of  e ~, the  latter  cannot be solved explicitly without usage of specific labor  
supply and production functions. However, regardless of the exact shape of these 
functions, the level of enforcement that eliminates the wage differential is clearly 
positive, less than unity, and increasing in the elasticity differential, hA - hB. ¦    
                     3. ILLEGALIZATION IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET 
 
Consider alternatively a competitive labor market with a large number of identical 
employers, all  producing  the  same  product  with  the  same  production  function 
f(A + B). Using again  wA and  B w to denote the wage rates of  A and  B workers, 
respectively, the expected profit of the discriminatory employer will be 
 
                         B w w p B w A w B A f E B A B A ) ( ) ( - - - - + = l p ,                     (8) 
where, contrary to the monopsonistic case, the wage rates wA and  B w  are independent 
of the employer's employment levels and perceived as exogenously given. 
Maximizing (8) with respect to A and B, the first-order conditions immediately imply 
that (1 - e)(wA - B w ) = 0, where e = pl denotes again the level of enforcement. 
Hence, for any e „ 1, wA = B w  at equilibrium, implying that there is no discrimination. 
This is not surprising: because every employer faces infinitely elastic supply curves 
for A and B workers, there is no elasticity differential in labor supply, hence no 
incentive to discriminate between the two groups of workers.  
 
Recognizing this problem, t he neoclassical theory of competitive wage 
discrimination, introduced by Becker (1957) and further developed by Arrow (1974a, 
1974b), replaces profit maximization with utility maximization. Rather than stemming 
from differences in labor supply elasticities, a wage differential will now stem from a 
taste for discrimination against  B workers, although both types of workers have 
identical productive skills. Specifically, the employer's utility function is assumed to 
be U = U(p, A, B), where Up > 0, UA > 0 but UB < 0. To simplify, however, the 
manipulation of expected utility when wage discrimination is illegal, suppose that the 
utility function is additively separable in the three arguments. Expected utility will 
then be stated as  
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where y ¢(A) > 0, f ¢(B) > 0 and y "(A) < 0, f"(B) > 0. The employer will now choose 
the employment levels of A and B workers so as to at maximize his expected utility 
(9), subject to the expected profit constraint (8). Substituting (8) into (9), the first-
order conditions for a maximum are             
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requiring again that the marginal revenue from employment, f ¢(A + B), equate the 
expected marginal cost. Notice that the marginal monetary cost of employing  A 
workers is moderated by their marginal utility to the employer, y ¢(A), whereas the marginal cost of employing B workers is augmented by their marginal disutility to the 
employer, f ¢(B).   
 
Substituting one condition in the other to eliminate f ¢(A + B ) and rearranging, the 
employer’s optimum must satisfy (assuming e „ 1)  
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The neoclassical theory of discrimination in a competitive labor market implicitly 
assumes that wage discrimination is not illegal. Consequently, there is no 
enforcement. Substituting e = 0 in equation (12) yields the well-known result of this 
theory: the employer would end up paying A workers a higher wage than he pays B 
workers (i.e., wA > wB) if, and only if, he has a taste for discriminating in favor of A 
workers [y ¢(A) > 0)], against B workers [f ¢(B) > 0], or both. An implicit assumption 
of the neoclassical theory underlying this result is that the demand for workers is the 
sole determinant of the equilibrium wage rates, or, in other words, that the market 
supply curves of A and B workers are perfectly inelastic [see Arrow (1972b), p.187].   
Condition (12) gives rise to two propositions regarding the relationship between the 
wage differential and enforcement in a competitive labor market. 
 
Proposition 4:  Illegalization of wage discrimination, accompanied by some 
enforcement, as well as further increasing the level of enforcement (below unity), will 
reduce the wage rate of  B workers without affecting the wage rate of A workers, 
consequently increasing the wage differential in a competitive market.  
 
Proof: Because the supply curves of A and B workers are perfectly inelastic, y ¢(A) 
and f ¢(B) must remain constant in a competitive equilibrium. Condition (12) then 
implies that the wage differential is greater in the presence of some enforcement (e > 
0) than in its absence. The greater the level of enforcement (below e = 1), the greater 
will be the wage differential. Furthermore, condition (10) reveals that the equilibrium 
level of wA is not affected by the appearance of enforcement, hence condition (11) can 
only be satisfied with a lower level of wB. The greater the level of enforcement, the 
lower must be the level of wB. ¦  
 
Proposition 5: There is no (less than unity) level of enforcement that eliminates the 
wage differential in a competitive market. A sufficiently high (unit) level of 
enforcement will only eliminate B workers out of the market. 
 
Proof: Suppose first that e < 1. Substituting wA = wB into condition (12) yields y¢(A) 
+ f ¢(B) = 0, which contradicts the taste for discrimination assumption. Hence, there is 
no level of e < 1 that solves condition (12) for wA = wB. Suppose now that e = 1. Evidently, condition (12) does not hold for this case. Furthermore, it is easily verified 
that the effective wage rate employers expect to pay B workers, wB + e(wA - wB), now 
equals the wage rate of A workers. It thus follows that for e = 1, market forces yield a 
corner solution at which only A workers are employed. Indeed, if both groups are of 
equal productivity and are paid the same, there is no incentive to employ B workers 
who bear disutility to employers. Compliance with the equal pay law can thus be 
reached only by escaping the employment of B workers all together.¦   
 
 
                                         4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
     
 
We have examined how illegalization of wage discrimination in monopsonistic and 
competitive markets will affect the wage differential between two groups of equally 
productive workers. While illegalization will reduce the wage differential in a 
monopsonistic market, and a sufficiently high level of enforcement will eliminate the 
wage differential altogether, it will, counter-intuitively, increase the wage differential 
in a competitive market. It is only by raising the level of enforcement sufficiently high 
to eliminate the incentive for employers to hire the discriminated-against group that 
the wage differential can be eliminated. Evidently, this disturbing consequence of 
effective enforcement is the exact opposite of what illegalization is meant to achieve. 
Nevertheless, it bears strong resemblance to the well-known consequence of effective 
minimum wage enforcement: while a fraction of the sub-minimum wage workers gets 
a higher pay, another fraction ends up unemployed. The problem, however, is that in 
the minimum wage case at least some of the target population remains in the market 
and benefits from the law, whereas in the present case nobody does, as the entire 
group whose wages the law seeks to protect is kicked out of the market.     
 
Two shortcomings of the model should be noted. First, the probability of getting 
caught and punished for wage discrimination has been assumed constant, independent 
of  the wage differential or the employment levels. However, the greater the wage 
differential or the number of discriminated-against workers, the higher the probability 
that a complaint will be filed with the enforcement agency and the employer be sued 
for violating the equal wage law. Making the probability of detection dependent on 
the employer’s choice variables would add more realism to the model, but at the cost 
of complicating the exposition and probably yielding ambiguous results. Second, the 
model has focused on the  equal pay aspect of anti-discrimination legislation, 
abstracting from the fact that discriminatory hiring is illegal too. In particular, while 
the model suggests that if the level of enforcement is sufficiently high a competitive 
employer will avoid hiring any discriminated-against workers, costs of hiring 
discrimination suits that might be brought against him are ignored. Taking account of 
this risk could generate an incentive to hiring members of the discriminated-against 
group, but would also add a second source of uncertainty to the model, which would 








                                                                NOTES 
 
 
1 US anti-discrimination legislation began in 1963, when Congress passed the Equal 
Pay Act ( EPA) which prohibits unequal pay for women who perform equal (or 
"substantially equal") work to men under the same conditions. A year later, Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act was passed, forbidding wage discrimination against other 
minorities as well on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin.    
 
2 Even Gary Becker, who in 1968 published his seminal work on crime and 
punishment, makes no reference to the criminality of discrimination in his 1971 
revision of  The Economics of Discrimination. For a comprehensive survey of the 
discrimination literature, see for example, Cain (1986). 
 
3 See, for example, Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), Chang and Ehrlich (1985), Lot and 
Roberts (1995), Yaniv (1994, 2001).  
 
4 For an extensive discussion of the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
supporting this assumption with respect to sex discrimination see Sharir (1995). 
Because no empirical evidence regarding labor supply elasticities by sex facing a firm 
seem to exist, Sharir relates to studies of labor supply elasticities to the market, such 
as Cardwell and Rosenzweig (1980), who estimated elasticities of supply of annual 
hours to the market by sex, finding that the mean wage elasticity for white males was 
0.4 as compared with 0.103 for white never-married females.       
 
5 While the sign of W1 cannot, in general, be determined, it will be unambiguously 
negative if hA £ 1. The sign of W2 is negative as long as e £ 1, which, as shown below, 
must be the case if wage discrimination is practiced. W > 0 is assumed to hold at the 
optimum.  
 
6 Alternatively, substituting (2') into (3') and rearranging yields  
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